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HIGH-DEDUCTIBLE HEALTH INSURANCE POLICIES WITH HEALTH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS: A 
POLICY REVIEW 
  
RACHEL DODY 
Grand Valley State University 
  
Abstract 
  
The rise of the high-deductible health insurance plan (HDHP) is among the most significant health insurance 
developments in recent decades but the plans are controversial.  Those in support of HDHPs argue these plans will 
encourage people to be “more astute health care consumers” and to make healthcare decisions “on the basis of 
cost and quality information” (Fronstin & Collins, 2005, p.4).  This will theoretically eliminate the moral hazard 
with which health insurance and health care has been plagued, lead to decreased waste, and therefore lower 
consumption and cost.  Critics, however, point to evidence that these new insurance plans will lead to adverse 
selection and that the high out-of-pocket costs will discourage the use of health care services, especially by those in 
lower income brackets or those who have chronic conditions.  Critics also suggest these plans will do nothing to 
address the skyrocketing costs of healthcare (Weissert & Weissert, 2006, p.387, Fronstin & Collins, 2005).  The 
passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) of 2010, with its mandate that all Americans be 
covered by health insurance, is likely to make these lower-premium, high-deductible health plans more prevalent 
and therefore worthy of intense scrutiny. 
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High-deductible Health Insurance Policies with Health Savings Accounts: A Policy Review 
  
Healthcare costs have been spiraling out of control for some time now, and in 2010 healthcare spending 
accounted for more than seventeen percent of America’s GDP, meaning Americans spent over eight thousand 
dollars per person on healthcare in 2010 alone (Kane).  There are a host of factors that contribute to these very high 
costs, including an aging population, unhealthy lifestyle choices, the costs of new technology, malpractice lawsuits 
and defensive medicine, over-utilization, insurance administration costs, and so on.  High-deductible health plans 
offer one way to help control cost because they place more of the cost burden onto the healthcare consumer, thereby 
making it in the consumer’s best interest to be more judicious overall with their healthcare dollar.  While there is 
evidence to suggest that this mechanism for cost control works well in certain situations and for certain individuals, 
other evidence suggests that HDHPs have the potential to lead to negative health utilization and outcomes and 
should warrant further study. 
  
Background 
  
Both employer- and government-sponsored health insurance plans have traditionally offered defined benefits, 
leading to moral hazard for participants who have little incentive to be concerned with price as they are insulated 
from the cost of their own health care, leading to increased demand for health services and subsequently increased 
cost (Feldstein, 2007, p.2).  The more of a stake the consumer has in his or her spending, however, the more 
financially judicious and less wasteful he or she theoretically will behave.  To address the rising cost of health care, 
one solution might be to “encourage more cost conscious spending by placing more of the health care financing 
burden on out-of-pocket spending” and high-deductible plans do just that (Blumberg & Clemans-Cope, 2009, p.1). 
Theoretically, participants will be actively engaged in their treatment, including selecting providers who provide 
better value for their services (benefit to patient vs. cost) and be more prudent in their overall use of health care 
services (i.e. investigating effective, less costly treatment measures and not seeking treatment for minor problems).  
Health insurance is expensive for both employers and employees; in 2010, the average premium for employer-
sponsored health insurance was $5,049 for individual coverage and $13,770 for a family (Claxton et al., 2010, p.1).  
Policy changes, combined with rapidly rising health insurance premiums and increased global competition, means 
that a growing number of United States employers are looking for cost-savings measures and many are finding them 
in high-deductible health plans (Fronstin & Collins, 2005).  In a 2010 study, Claxton et al. found the percentage of 
employees with a plan deductible of at least $1,000 increased from 10% in 2006 to 27% in 2010 (p. 2). In a 2013 
Towers Watson study of employer healthcare purchasing (as reported by Andrews, 2013), 66% of large companies 
surveyed offered a high-deductible plan.  As of January 2012, an estimated 13.5 million Americans were enrolled in 
HDHPs, up from just over six million in 2008 (America’s Health Insurance Plans, 2010).   
High-deductible health plans, called also “consumer-driven” and “consumer-directed” plans, offer both 
employers and participants up-front cost savings in the form of lower monthly premiums (Claxton et al., 2010).  
These plans are essentially catastrophic insurance policies with high-deductibles of at least $1,200 for an individual 
and $2,400 for families.  The plan participant is responsible for the entire cost of his or her health care (with 
exception to approved preventative services which are paid entirely by the health insurer), at the insurer’s negotiated 
rate until he or she meets the deductible, after which point the plan functions like a Preferred Provider Organization 
(PPO) and covers all health care expenses. 
HDHP enrollees very often also have health savings accounts (HSAs); these are tax-advantaged savings 
accounts for use on approved medical expenditures and are intended to incentivize healthcare savings so participants 
can pay for larger out-of-pocket expenses.  The Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 
2003 (MMA) expanded eligibility for these tax-advantaged medical savings accounts and, in part, fueled the rise of 
the HDHP.  Monies deposited into HSAs are exempt from federal income tax, interest accrues tax-free, funds are 
allowed to roll over from one year into the next, and can be invested much like an Individual Retirement Account 
(IRA).  Deposits may be funded wholly or in part by employers, participants, or any other third party wishing to 
make a contribution to the account.  HSA participants are currently allowed to contribute an annual maximum of 
$3,100 for an individual and $6,250 for a family, with older participants able to contribute extra for “catch-up 
contributions.”  Balances belong to the individual insured and are therefore portable from one employer to another, 
and after the age of 65, the beneficiary can withdraw funds as regular taxable income without penalty.   
  
Policy Targets 
  
HDHPs with their tax-advantaged HSAs are alluring to health insurers and employers; for insurers, these 
plans decrease their administrative costs as an increased number of participants pay a majority of claims out of 
pocket.  In this way, the insurers experience cost savings because they process fewer claims.  Employers are 
increasingly experimenting with HDHPs because these plans lower their portion of the premium and shift their 
responsibility from “defined benefits to defined contributions” (Johnson et al., 2007).  By 2005, 20% of employers 
offered HDHPs, up from 5% in 2003 (Claxton, Gil, & Finder, 2005).  Employers can experience up to a twenty 
percent cost savings on their health spending by switching to a high deductible option (Parker-Pope, 2009).  
HDHPs can also be attractive to individuals, as they offer increased consumer control and empowerment on 
health spending, giving health care consumers incentives to be more astute consumers.  Low-consuming health 
insurance participants are attracted to HDHPs with HSAs because the plans allow them to pay a fairer price, one that 
is in line with their actual usage of health services.  This often healthier, lower-consuming population is allowed to 
lessen their subsidy of their higher-consuming counterparts by switching to HDHPs. Additionally, high deductible 
plans offer a relatively low-cost option (in the form of low premiums) for otherwise uninsured independent 
consumers to purchase catastrophic health insurance on their own.  
  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
While high deductible plans are relatively new to the health insurance landscape, a body of research already 
exists on them.  The foremost study pertaining to HDHPs was done by RAND Corporation between 1974 and 1982 
and although it took place decades ago, it “remains the only long-term, experimental study of cost sharing and its 
effect on service use, quality of care, and health” (RAND, 2006, p.1).  Other pertinent research includes those 
examining selection bias, the effects of out-of-pocket costs on utilization of services, and participant self-reporting 
of behavior changes.  While there are some anecdotes of HDHPs being good for consumers, much of the research 
suggests that the way people change their behavior when asked to pay more out of their pockets may serve to reduce 
cost in some situations but is likely not the best for their care-seeking and for their overall health. 
The RAND Corporation’s 1982 study sought to answer what effects the degree of cost sharing (free vs. varied 
levels of payments) would have on health care behaviors and outcomes. The study was made possible by a Health 
and Human Services grant and included data from 2,005 participating families, with a total of 3,958 individuals 
included.  All participants were healthy enough not to be enrolled in Medicare and were randomly assigned to 
varying insurance policies for three to five years.  RAND found that patients who experienced cost sharing 
decreased their usage of health services but the reduction “had no adverse effect on participants’ health” (RAND, 
2006, p.3).  Free care had a small positive impact on participant health outcomes; participants with specific 
conditions such as hypertension, especially those in very low income brackets that also had these conditions, 
benefitted the most from free care.  Vision and dental care also improved among the lower-income participants on 
the free plan.  Interestingly, cost sharing did not lead people to reduce risky behaviors or take better care of 
themselves; smoking habits and obesity rates remained unchanged even though the individuals would be 
shouldering some of the cost of treatment if these lifestyle choices resulted in need for care (RAND, 2006).   
The U.S. Government Accountability Organization (GAO) found adverse selection in those who elected 
HDHPs when they analyzed data from two large employers who had introduced HRAs during the 2003 plan year.  
Studying data from 2001 through 2005, they found that those who switched to the HRA were “younger, more likely 
to be male, and elect single coverage than those who remained in the PPO plan” (Dicken, 2010, p.12).  They were 
also an average of three years younger, utilized fewer services, and filled an average of six fewer prescriptions per 
year prior to switching, as compared to those who stayed in the traditional plan (Dicken, 2010 p.16).  This in itself is 
not necessarily bad, but it could have negative ramifications for the older, high-utilizing counterparts who remain in 
the traditional plans. 
Schellerhorn (2001) studied the effects of Switzerland’s 1996 health reform, which gave individuals a choice 
of copayments for their mandatory basic health insurance coverage, and found similar selection bias. The likelihood 
a person would take a higher copayment had an inverse relationship with age, probably due to older populations 
being more risk averse or because they expected to have health problems as they aged.  Additionally, being 
overweight or being a smoker decreased the likelihood someone would switch to a higher copayment (Schellerhorn, 
2001, p. 449).   
Research suggests that as people shoulder more of the cost of a service their utilization rates drop.  While this 
is encouraging for non-medically necessary services, the effect holds true for medically necessary services as well.  
Blustein’s 1995 study focused on the effects of copayments on rates of mammography and found that while only 37 
percent of the women studied had a mammogram during the two-year period, women who lacked supplemental 
insurance (who had more out-of-pocket costs) got mammograms at a rate of only 14 percent.  Clearly, requiring 
copayments for mammograms is an obstacle for women, even though it is a proven preventative test. Wharam et al. 
(2007) considered emergency department visits of individuals who had switched from traditional health plans to 
high deductibles and found they visited the emergency department less frequently than the control group.  
Emergency visits decreased from 197.5 to 178.1 per 1,000 participants, while visits among controls remained at 
approximately 220 per 1,000.  In particular, the reductions came “primarily in repeat visits for conditions that were 
not classified as high severity, and had decreases in the rate of hospitalizations from the emergency department.”  
Wharam et al. (2008) also studied rates of cancer screening before and after switching to HDHPs. The HDHP 
covered some screenings (mammography, Papanicolaou tests, and fecal occult blood testing) at 100 percent but not 
others (colonoscopy, flexible sigmoidoscopy, or double-contrast barium enema). His results suggested that cancer 
screening in the HDHP population did not change for the tests that were covered, but decreased for the tests that 
were not covered, perhaps because they chose to substitute these tests for another that was covered or less costly, but 
perhaps because they skipped it altogether. 
Lieu et al. (2007) held focus groups comprised of adults whose families experienced high or unexpected out-
of-pocket health care costs with their HDHP.  While all participants understood the general workings of their plan, 
each reported having confusion due to plan complexities.  Focus group members described an increased awareness 
of health care costs but identified a number of barriers to meaningful action to control these costs.  Barriers cited 
included: urgent problems, incorrect expectations of coverage, and reluctance to talk about costs with their doctors.  
Lieu also found that HDHP participants tried to control costs by delaying or avoiding physician visits and felt that 
they had very little control over costs once they were actually in a treatment setting. 
  
ANALYSIS 
  
Intended Outcomes 
  
Increased medical savings 
An increased number of Americans are saving for their own healthcare and each is saving a greater amount; 
this means they will therefore have a greater stake in where and how their health care money is being spent.  Overall 
health care savings for HDHPs with savings options has increased; there was an aggregate $7.7 billion in 5.7 million 
HSAs and HRAs in 2010, up from 1.2 million accounts with $835.4 million in 2006. (Fronstin, 2011).  
  
Increased consumer awareness 
HDHPs and HSAs serve to increase consumer awareness in health care by having the consumer bear a larger 
percentage of the out of pocket costs, having what many refer to as ‘more skin in the game.’  This reduces moral 
hazard and thereby decreases demand and overall health care prices.  There is evidence that people in the high 
deductible plans are behaving differently than their comprehensive health plan counterparts; Fronstin and Collins 
(2005) found them to be much more likely to report their health insurance terms made them think about cost before 
seeing their doctor or filling a prescription.  Moreover, study participants reported having “checked whether their 
health plan would cover their costs as well as the price of a service prior to receiving care, and to discuss treatment 
options and the cost of care with their doctor” (Fronstin & Collins, 2005, p.16).  Health care consumers with HDHPs 
and HSAs also appear more likely to have a budget, ask for generic prescriptions, and ask for the price of a service 
(Saranow Schultz, 2011). 
  
New negotiating tools 
A number of tools are emerging to assist health care consumers to negotiate with providers; websites 
including Healthcare Blue Book and New Choice Health arm consumers with typical costs of medical procedures 
for their area.  Many insurance providers list their negotiated rates on their website, which can be a useful tool for 
those with HDHPs.  Additionally, news articles and blogs as well as professional negotiating services (such as the 
Medical Billing Advocates of America) are emerging, with the goal of assisting people with the task of negotiating 
with their health care professionals (Lee, 2009, Kullgren, 2011). 
  
Success stories 
Powerful stories of individuals with HDHPs successfully negotiating their health care bills to a fraction of its 
rate abound.  The Cato Institute’s Michael Cannon is a “poster child” of how high deductible health insurances can 
lead people to make shrewd financial decisions when it comes to their health care dollar; he injured his leg playing 
soccer and because he knew he would be paying the first $2,500 out of his own pocket he made a series of 
calculated decisions in an effort to control cost.  Along with foregoing the ER and having his doctor not order an X-
ray, he was able to negotiate the cost of an MRI down to $700, a “53 percent discount from the sticker price-and 
more than six times the discount negotiated by [his] insurance company” (Canon, 2007, p.2).  A commenter on a 
New York Times health blog reported paying $400 for his or her initial doctor visit but when they offered to pay 
cash for their second visit, paid only $65 (Parker-Pope, 2009).  Clearly, in some instances the effects of having more 
“skin” in the healthcare “game” is effective at not only lowering costs for insurers and participants but in decreasing 
demand for unnecessary services. 
  
Premium cost savings 
HDHPs can lead to overall savings for participants when compared to comprehensive plans, even if they meet 
their annual deductible.  If the premium savings and tax advantages for their HSA monies are greater than the cost of 
their deductible, they experience a net gain from having a high deductible.  In 2010, the average annual combined 
premium for employees and employers for family health insurance was $12,384, compared to $14,125 for an HMO 
(a difference of $1,741) (Claxton et al., 2010).  This, combined with premium variation (sometimes the difference 
between HDHP and traditional plan offerings can be much higher than $1,741) and the level at which employers 
pass their premium savings on to their employees, along with the participant’s effective tax rate, can make HDHPs 
with savings options a good choice. 
  
Unintended Outcomes 
  
Numerous unintended outcomes of HDHPs and higher out-of-pocket costs have been recorded, including 
participants imprudently modifying care-seeking behavior, not applying cost-conscious behaviors to all aspects of 
their health care experience, adverse selection, affordability problems, limited benefits and use of the tax-advantaged 
savings accounts, negligible effects on coverage for the uninsured and negative effects for providers. 
  
Adverse care-seeking behavior and health outcomes 
Unintended clinical problems will occur if consumers do not make educated, prudent health care spending 
decisions.  In a 2005 study of HDHPs, Reed et al. reported participants to be harmfully modifying their care-seeking 
behavior in response to cost: thirty nine percent of their participants self-reported “altering their emergency care-
seeking behaviors, with the most frequent reports being they had delayed or avoided care or had sought help via the 
telephone or internet.” (p. 1149).  Additionally, there is evidence to support that enrollees in HDHPs are 
“significantly more likely to skimp on their medications” as compared to their comprehensive health plan 
counterparts; 26% of people with HDHPs reported not filling prescriptions because of cost, as compared to 16% of 
comprehensive plans not filling prescriptions (Fronstin & Collins, 2005, p. 15).  
HDHP participants are less likely than traditional health plan enrollees to fill prescriptions due to cost, more 
likely to forego preventative care, and are “more likely to report that they had had health problems as a result of 
avoiding seeing a physician because of cost” (Lee & Zapert, 2005, p.1203).  Reed et al. (2009) found that consumers 
lacked a good understanding of their health insurance policies, including which services were exempt from their 
deductible.  Even though a multitude of preventative procedures were covered entirely before deductible, 
participants were uneducated to these details and therefore indiscriminately avoided care.  Participants with poor 
health status or with incomes less than $50,000 were “significantly more likely to report changing their behavior” 
(Reed et al., 2009, p.1149).   
The RAND Experiment findings, discussed earlier, indicate that people with higher co-payments use less 
health care and “the poor and those at highest risk for disease were most negatively affected by increased cost-
sharing” (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2006, p.17).  The average person is not medically trained and therefore ill-
equipped to make good decisions with respect to what treatments are necessary.  While care-seeking behavior 
changes can be good if they result in people not going to their physician for unnecessary things like the common 
cold, it can be disastrous if the change results in people avoiding care for more serious conditions.  It is reasonable to 
assume that when someone skimps on their diabetes medicine and/or avoids the doctor, their health outcome will be 
negatively affected.  
  
Interaction and negotiation with care providers 
While researchers found that HDHP participants modified certain types of cost-conscious behaviors, they 
observed them not modifying other behaviors, including “talking to a doctor about prescriptions and costs, asking a 
doctor to recommend a less costly drug and checking the quality rating of a hospital or doctor” (Saranow Schultz, 
2011, para. 3).   
  Healthcare is notoriously insensitive to typical market forces on price, due to healthcare professionals, not 
consumers, being the dominant force for determining demand through diagnosis and treatment plans and consumers 
often not having adequate information to make decisions that balance cost and quality.  Steven Brill, in his popular 
Time Magazine piece about exorbitantly high medical bills, said of patients:"[t]hey are powerless buyers in a seller’s 
market where the only sure thing is the profit of the sellers” (2013).  The combination of doctors often lacking 
pricing information and their patients’ reluctance to question treatments and prices leads to an atmosphere in which 
patients have little information to use their health care money wisely.  Lieu et al. (2009) noted that “[p]atients were 
hesitant to discuss costs with doctors, despite their feeling that the HDHP had increased their awareness of costs” in 
part because they “felt that doctors did not have information or care about costs, or that it was not appropriate to 
question doctors' recommendations based on their financial ramifications” (p. 253).  Additionally, patients rarely 
know appropriate care options or have all the information they need to make an informed decision.  While it may be 
difficult even for well-educated people to make health care decisions, “as many as 90 million adults have low 
literacy skills” such that their “ability to make informed health care decisions” may be negatively impacted (KFF, 
2006 p.18).  If prices and costs of medical care were transparent and more health care professionals outside of the 
billing department knew what prices were, there would be more room for choice and negotiation.  As it is, the idea 
that participants will question their doctors on treatment and cost to save money may be misguided.  Additionally, 
people often require care when they are really sick, in pain, unconscious, etc. and are therefore unable to make 
educated decisions, much less negotiate prices. 
 
Adverse selection 
Adverse participant selection is also an area of great concern, as early research suggests that “healthier and 
wealthier individuals are more likely to purchase HDHPs than their counterparts” (Johnson et al., 2007).  For the tax 
year 2004, the Kaiser Family Foundation found the average income of those reporting HSA contributions was, 
“about $76,000, compared to $30,000 for all tax filers under age 65” (KFF, 2006, p.16).  While the low-premium 
HDHPs combined with the ability to save tax-free has the potential to draw the young and healthy into insurance 
pools, it also has the very real possibility of drawing those same individuals out of existing insurance pools in which 
they are subsidizing the care of the less healthy.  This selection allows healthier, low-risk individuals access to fairer 
health insurance rates but at the expense of the larger group.  Healthy individuals who are also in higher tax brackets 
who can realize financial benefits from these plans will therefore leave the most vulnerable (less healthy, lower-
income) in traditional comprehensive plans, which may become financially insolvent.   
  
Affordability of insurance and cost of care 
Those who have HDHPs are spending more of their income on health care than their comprehensive plan 
counterparts, despite similar rates of use; forty two percent of HDHP members spent at least five percent of their 
total income on out-of-pocket healthcare costs and premiums, as compared to twelve percent of comprehensive plan 
participants (Fronstin & Collins, 2005, p.1).  This increased spending leads to an increase medical debt; Mahon and 
Root (2005) found “more than half of adults with deductibles over $1,000 experience medical bill or debt problems, 
compared with one-quarter of those with no deductibles” (para. 3).  This problem becomes compounded when 
people with chronic diseases carry high deductibles, as they are twice as likely to reach their deductible each year 
(KFF, 2006). 
High deductible plans are often, but not always, accompanied by lower monthly premiums.  The cost of high 
deductibles can be difficult to bear on their own, but costs can be extremely high when combined with a typical 
premium; Hoffman and Tolbert (2006) estimate that insurance and out-of-pocket medical expenses would take up 
such an extraordinary percentage of a low-income family’s annual budget that they would be left with very little 
money to spend on things other than basic necessities (p.2).    
HSAs offer more of a benefit to young, healthy populations who have time to build considerable savings and 
accrue interest before the age at which they will likely need high-cost medical interventions.  Without having time to 
build up necessary savings, older HDHP participants will therefore be at a disadvantage when they are faced with 
paying very high out of pocket costs until they meet their deductible. 
It is unclear how this new trend in health insurance has or will affect national health care costs, if at all.  As of 
2010, only three percent of the entire population of the United States had HDHPs (AHIP, 2010).  Even if these plans 
were extremely effective at reducing cost and demand in a majority of the population, they do nothing to address 
very costly procedures and the seriously ill, which account for a huge proportion of the nation’s health care 
expenses.  The Kaiser Family Foundation estimated that almost half of all healthcare expenses are attributable to the 
top five percent of healthcare spenders, for whom (if they are seriously ill) cost sharing is “totally inappropriate” 
(KFF, 2006, Gwande, Fisher, Gruber, & Rosenthal, 2009). 
  
Tax advantages not advantageous to many 
The tax advantages that come with HSAs are most valuable to those who have higher incomes and higher 
marginal tax rates, leading many critics to call HSAs tax shelters for healthy, well-heeled people.  A 2008 
Government Accountability Office study found the average household income of people with HSAs to be $139,000, 
compared to $57,000 for all other filers (Dicken, 2010).  The tax subsidy is of little or no value to people who have 
small income tax liabilities, compounded by the fact that people who earn less money have little or no spare money 
to place in an HSA.  Blumberg and Clemens-Cope (2009) note that, despite the tax advantages, almost half of 
eligible participants fail to open HSAs, and “two-thirds of employers report making no contribution to the HSAs of 
their workers” (p.1).  Consequently, people with low incomes or with higher healthcare needs who are enrolled in 
HDHPs will more than likely “be exposed to much larger out-of-pocket financial burdens than they would be under 
a comprehensive policy” (Blumberg & Clemens, 2009, p.1). 
  
Impact on uninsured 
It is unlikely that coverage rates will improve among the uninsured as a result of HDHPs with HSAs because 
more than two of every three nonelderly uninsured persons falls into the low-income category and have little or no 
tax liability.  Furthermore, it is estimated that plans with high out-of-pocket costs do not offer the uninsured poor 
enough benefit to offset the cost of the premium and Davis, Doty, & Ho (2005) write, “few low-income individuals 
can afford to purchase coverage if premiums exceed 5 percent of income” (Hoffman & Tolbert, 2006, p.4, Davis, 
Doty, & Ho, 2005, para. 13).  RAND’s findings indicate that low income individuals have the best health outcomes 
when they receive free care, so high deductible insurances are the least appropriate option for this segment of the 
population. 
  
Impact on providers 
Pollack, Mallya, & Polsky (2008) found that physician knowledge of a patient’s socioeconomic status and 
insurance deductible affected which type of testing he or she recommended for colorectal cancer screenings.  They 
found that “the odds of receiving inappropriate colorectal cancer screening recommendations were almost five times 
higher for patients with low SES in high deductible coverage than for patients with high SES in traditional low-
deductible plans,” which raises serious ethical questions with respect to high deductible plans and the treatment of 
the poor. 
Providers are likely to experience collection problems as enrollment in HDHPs and medical debt increases.  
As previously discussed, an increased percentage of care will be subject to collection problems, which will increase 
the financial burden on health care providers.  It is possible that if this problem becomes pronounced, physicians 
will not service HDHP participants, as some have done with Medicare or Medicaid participants, or require full 
payment in advance of services.  Additionally, providers should expect an increase in telephone inquiries and should 
be prepared with standard procedures for handling these (Lieu et al., 2009). 
  
DISCUSSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
  
A number of measures should be considered to remedy the array of negative, unintended consequences that 
come with HDHPs because it is likely that, regardless of their flaws, the prevalence of HDHPs will only increase.  
Any new law or regulation of high deductible health plans should be careful not to decrease the availability or 
offering of the product since the choice for many Americans is not between a traditional plan and a high deductible 
plan; it may be between a high deductible plan and no insurance.  If new laws and regulations make high deductible 
plans less available, these new laws may only serve to increase the size of the uninsured population and amplify an 
already complicated problem.  In order to avoid the detrimental effects of HDHPs as they currently exist, each of the 
negative outcomes previously outlined should be addressed. 
Participants need to understand their plans (perhaps plans could be standardized and simplified throughout the 
nation), have access to provider cost and quality information, have sufficient incentive and time to save for future 
medical costs, and have access to a health care market that offers competitive pricing of services.  To this end, health 
insurers who offer high deductible plans should be required to provide easily-understood, easily accessible 
educational materials to participants, covering their high deductible plan benefits.  Additionally, health care 
providers could be required to post cost and quality outcome data, which could be aggregated in an easy-to-use 
public website.  The federal government could also create a healthcare advisory group to consult and/or train HDHP 
participants in health-related decision making.  The most effective, lowest-cost treatments of minor ailments and 
procedures could be negotiated by the health insurance company so that everyone’s health care dollar goes further 
(i.e. procedures that can be done on an outpatient rather than inpatient basis ought to be only performed outpatient).   
To encourage health saving behavior for those in lower income brackets whose behavior is not changed by 
tax-free savings options, the federal government should strongly consider adding extra incentives (perhaps below the 
line tax credits for monies deposited into HSAs) for lower-income individuals to save for their own health care 
needs.  Older participants, perhaps those fifty years of age and older, who join HDHPs could receive partially 
subsidized care, perhaps in the form of lower deductibles, because they have not had time to build HSAs.  In an 
effort to increase affordability of these plans, low-income individuals should receive discounted premium rates and a 
sliding scale for deductibles. 
As it would be difficult to control HDHPs effects of adverse selection, it is expected that an increased number 
of participants will have chronic conditions such as heart disease, diabetes, and hypertension.  Treatment for 
conditions such as these should be paid for entirely by the insurer, without regard for deductible. 
  
CONCLUSION 
  
The driving idea behind high deductible health plans and health savings accounts is to give health insurance 
participants an incentive to be actively engaged with the quality and price of the health services they receive, as they 
would be with any other product.  The use of high deductibles and incentivizing saving for health expenses through 
HSAs, while at the same time covering preventative measures, was thought to increase consumer participation in 
health care decisions, decrease costs, and improve quality measures.  These results have not yet been widely 
observed.  Rather, HDHP participants are haphazardly avoiding or forgoing care, often have barriers to effectively 
control cost, and are experiencing higher out of pocket costs while often not taking advantage of HSAs.  HDHPs 
with HSAs also attract healthier, higher incomes, which will lead to adverse selection for those who remain in 
traditional comprehensive plans.  Once measures have been put in place to address the aforementioned flaws 
associated with HDHPs, the effects of high out of pocket cost on care-seeking behavior and its effect on the long-
term health of participants should be further evaluated.   
  
REFERENCES 
  
 America’s Health Insurance Plans. (2012, May). January 2012 census shows 13.5 million people covered 
by HSA/high-deductible health plans.  Washington, DC: America’s Health Insurance Plans.   
 Andrews, M. (2013, March 26).  Large companies are increasingly offering workers only high deductible 
health plans.  Kaiser Health News.  Retrieved from http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Features/Insuring-Your-
Health/2013/032613-Michelle-Andrews-on-high-deductible-plans-and-large-employers.aspx 
Blumberg, L. J., Clemans-Cope, L. (2009). Health savings accounts and high-deductible health insurance 
plans: Implications for those with high medical costs, low incomes, and the uninsured. Retrieved from 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411833_health_saving_account.pdf 
Blustein, J.  (1995).  Medicare coverage, supplemental insurance, and the use of mammography by older 
women. The New England Journal of Medicine, 332(17), 1138-43.  Retrieved from 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJM199504273321706  
Brill, S. (2013, March 4).  Bitter pill: Why medical bills are killing us.  Time Magazine.  Retrieved from 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2136864,00.html 
Canon, M.F.  (2007, June 15).  I'm not going to pay a lot for this MRI: Navigating the brave new world of 
consumer-directed health care.  The Weekly Standard.  Retrieved from 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/760hoavn.asp?page=1 
Claxton, G., DiJulio,B., Finder, B., Lundy, J., McHugh, M. Osei-Anto, Al, … Gabel, J.  (2010, September). 
Kaiser/HRET survey of employer-sponsored health benefits, 2010.   Retrieved from http://ehbs.kff.org/ 
Claxton, G., & Gil, I., & Finder, B. (2005). Employer health benefits 2005 annual survey.  Kaiser Family 
Foundation.  Retrieved from http://www.kff.org/insurance/7315/upload/7315.pdf 
Davis, K., Doty, M.M, Ho, A. (2005, April). How high is too high? Implications of high-deductible health 
plans. The Commonwealth Fund.  Retrieved from http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Fund-
Reports/2005/Apr/How-High-Is-Too-High--Implications-of-High-Deductible-Health-Plans.aspx 
Dicken, J.E. (2010, July).  Consumer-directed health plans: Health status, spending, and utilization of 
enrollees in plans based on health reimbursement arrangements.  (GAO Document No. GAO-10-616). Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
Feldstein, P. J. (2007). Health policy issues: An economic perspective (4th ed.). Chicago, IL: Health 
Administration Press. 
Fronstin, P. & Collins, S. (2005, December). Early experience with high-deductible and consumer-driven 
health plans: Findings from the EBRI / Commonwealth Fund consumerism in Health Care Survey. Retrieved from 
http://www.ebri.org/publications/ib/index.cfm?fa=ibDisp&content_id=3606 
Fronstin, P.  (2011, January).  Health savings accounts and health reimbursement arrangements: Assets, 
account balances, and rollovers, 2006–2010. Retrieved from 
http://www.ebri.org/publications/ib/index.cfm?fa=ibDisp&content_id=4740 
Hoffman, C. & Tolbert, J. (2006, October).  Savings accounts and high deductible health plans: Are they an 
option for low-income families?  Retrieved from http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/7568.pdf  
Johnson, A. D., Wenge, S.E., McInerny, T.K., Barone, C.J., Lander, R., Mitsunaga, R.Y, Reuben, M.S., 
Walentik, C.A.  (2007, March).  High-deductible health plans and the new risks of consumer-driven health insurance 
products. Pediatrics, 119.3, 622-625. Retrieved from www.pediatrics.org/cgi/doi/10.1542/peds.2006-3687 
Kaiser Family Foundation.  (2006, November).  Illustrating the potential impacts of adverse selection on 
health insurance costs in consumer choice models. Retrieved from 
http://www.kff.org/insurance/snapshot/chcm111006oth2.cfm 
Kane, J. (2012, October 22).  Health costs: How the U.S. compares with other countries.  PBS.  Retrieved 
from http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2012/10/health-costs-how-the-us-compares-with-other-countries.html 
Kullgren, J. (2011, January 7).  How to haggle with your doctor.  The New York Times.  Retrieved from 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/01/07/how-to-haggle-with-your-doctor/ 
Lee, J.  (2009, November 4). Slash your medical bills: 7 ways to haggle.  CBS Money Watch.  Retrieved 
from http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/04/business/moneywatch/main5525807.shtml 
Lee, T.H. & Zapert, K. (2005). Do high-deductible health plans threaten quality of care?  The New England 
Journal of Medicine, 353 (12), 1202-4.  doi: 10.1056/NEJMp058209 
Lieu, T.A., Solomon, J.L., Sabin, J.E., Kullgren, J.T., Hinrichsen, V.L, Galbraith, A.A.  (2009, December 
22).  Consumer awareness and strategies among families with high-deductible health plans.  Journal of General 
Internal Medicine, 25 (3), 249-254. doi:10.1007/s11606-009-1184-5 
Mahon, M., Root, K. (2005). HSAs unlikely to help cover substantial numbers of uninsured Americans: 
New study.  The Commonwealth Fund.  Retrieved from http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/News/News-
Releases/2005/Apr/HSAs-Unlikely-to-Help-Cover-Substantial-Numbers-of-Uninsured-Americans--New-Study.aspx 
Parker-Pope, T.  (2009, October 16).  High-deductible health plans: Better for you or your employer?  The 
New York Times.  Retrieved from http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/16/high-deductible-health-plans-better-for-
you-or-your-employer/ 
Pollack, C.E., Mallya, G., Polsky, D. (2008). The impact of consumer-directed health plans and patient 
socioeconomic status on physician recommendations for colorectal cancer screening.  Journal of General Internal 
Medicine, 23 (10), 1595-1601. Retrieved from http://cat.inist.fr/?aModele=afficheN&cpsidt=20703656  
RAND.  (2006). The health insurance experiment: A classic RAND study speaks to the current health care 
reform debate. Santa Monica, CA. Retrieved from 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/2006/RAND_RB9174.pdf            
 Reed, M., Fung, V., Price, M., Brand, R., Benedetti, N., Derose, S., Newhouse, J., & Hsu, J. (2009). High-
deductible health insurance plans: Efforts to sharpen a blunt instrument. Health Affairs, 28(4), 1145-54. Retrieved 
from http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/In-the-Literature/2009/Aug/High-Deductible-Health-
Insurance-Plan-Efforts-to-Sharpen-a-Blunt.aspx 
Saranow Schultz, J. (2011, February).  Do health savings accounts make for savvy patients? The New York 
Times. Retrieved from http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/do-health-savings-accounts-make-for-savvy-
patients/ 
Schellerhorn, M.  (2001). Health econometrics and health economics: The effects of variable health 
insurance deductibles on the demand for physician visits.  Health Economics, 10, 441–456.  Retrieved from 
http://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/hlthec/v10y2001i5p441-456.html 
United States Government Accountability Office. (2008). Health savings accounts: Participation increased 
and was more common among individuals with higher incomes.  (GAO Document No. GAO-08-474R). 
Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.  
Weissert, W.G., & Weissert, C.S. (2006). Governing health: The politics of health policy (3rd ed.). 
Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Wharam J.F., Landon B.E., Galbraith A.A., Kleinman K.P., Soumerai S.B., Ross-Degnan D. (2007). 
Emergency department use and subsequent hospitalizations among members of a high-deductible health plan.  
Journal of the American Medical Association, 297(10), 1093-1102. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17356030 
Wharam, J.F., Galbraith, A.A., Kleinman, K.P., Soumerai, S.B., Ross-Degnan, D., & Landon, B. E. (2008). 
Cancer screening before and after switching to a high-deductible health plan.  Annals of Internal Medicine, 148(9), 
647-W132. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18458277 
  
  
 Rachel Dody is passionate about helping people live longer, healthier, happier lives and believes the best 
way to approach health problems is by working to prevent them in the first place. She believes that individuals have 
enormous power to shape the course of their own health through making better everyday choices/habits and that 
communities have a responsibility to help make the healthy choice the easy choice, the fun choice, and/or the 
affordable choice for their citizens. 
 Rachel earned her Bachelors in Psychology from Hope College and her Masters of Health Administration 
from GVSU.  She is now following her passion by working in two part-time positions, as Coordinator of 1 in 21 
Healthy Muskegon County (working to help Muskegon County become the healthiest county in Michigan by 2021) 
and as part of the Access Health team (a community-based not-for-profit that provides affordable health coverage 
and emphasizes health improvement and empowerment).  
     Rachel serves on the Board of Directors of both the Little Red House, Inc. and her neighborhood association.  
  
 	
